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‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design’ 
by 
Karen Yeung 
 
Abstract (250 words max) 
 
This paper draws on regulatory governance scholarship to argue that the analytic phenomenon currently 
known as ‘Big Data’ can be understood as a mode of ‘design-based’ regulation.  Although Big Data 
decision-making technologies can take the form of automated decision-making systems, this paper 
focuses on algorithmic decision-guidance techniques.  By highlighting correlations between data items 
that would not otherwise be observable, these techniques are being used to shape the informational 
choice context in which individual decision-making occurs, with the aim of channelling attention and 
decision-making in directions preferred by the ‘choice architect’.  By relying upon the use of ‘nudge’- a 
particular form of choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives, these techniques constitute a 
‘soft’ form of design-based control.  But, unlike the static Nudges popularised by Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008) such as placing the salad in front of the lasagne to encourage healthy eating, Big Data analytics 
nudges are extremely powerful and potent due to their networked, continuously updated, dynamic and 
pervasive nature (hence ‘hypernudge’).  I adopt a liberal, rights-based critique of these techniques, 
contrasting liberal theoretical accounts with selective insights from science and technology studies (STS) 
and surveillance studies on the other.  I argue that concerns about the legitimacy of these techniques are 
not satisfactorily resolved through reliance on individual notice and consent, touching upon the 
troubling implications for democracy and human flourishing if Big Data analytic techniques driven by 
commercial self-interest continue their onward march unchecked by effective and legitimate constraints.
                                                        
  Professor of Law, Director, Centre for Technology, Ethics, Law & Society (TELOS), The Dickson Poon 
School of Law, King’s College London. An earlier version of this paper was presented at Algorithms and 
Accountability, an international conference hosted by the NYU Law Institute and the Department of Media, Culture 
and Communications at New York University, New York, 28 February 2015.  I am grateful to Joris van Hoboken 
and Helen Nissenbaum for hosting my visit and providing me with an opportunity to discuss my ideas at such an 
immensely stimulating forum.  I am also indebted to Barbara Prainsack, Roger Brownsword, Lyria Bennett Moses, 
John Coggan, Alessandro Spina and Chris Townley for comments on earlier drafts.  All errors remain my own. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is claimed that society stands at the beginning of a New Industrial Revolution, powered by the engine 
of Big Data.  This paper focuses on how industry is harnessing Big Data to transform personal digital data 
into economic value, described by one leading cyberlawyer as the ‘latest form of bioprospecting’ 
(Cohen 2012).  Although the term ‘Big Data’ is widely used, no universal definition has yet emerged. 
Big Data is essentially shorthand for the combination of a technology and a process (Cohen 2012: 1919).  
The technology is a configuration of information-processing hardware capable of sifting, sorting and 
interrogating vast quantities of data very quickly.  The process involves mining data for patterns, 
distilling the patterns into predictive analytics, and applying the analytics to new data.  Together, the 
technology and the process comprise a methodological technique that utilises analytical software to 
identify patterns and correlations through the use of machine learning algorithms applied to (often 
unstructured) data items contained in multiple data sets, converting these data flows into a particular, 
highly data-intensive form of knowledge (Cohen 2012: 1919). A key contribution of Big Data is the 
ability to find useful correlations within datasets not capable of analysis by ordinary human assessment (Shaw 
2014). As boyd and Crawford observe, ‘Big Data’s value comes from patterns that can be derived from 
making connections about pieces of data, about an individual, about individuals in relation to others, 
about groups of people, or simply about the structure of information itself.  Big Data is important 
because it refers to an analytic phenomenon playing out in academia and industry’ (boyd and Crawford 
2012: 662), and it is this understanding of Big Data as a methodological approach and an analytic 
phenomenon that this paper adopts. 
 
I argue that Big Data’s extensive harvesting of personal digital data is troubling, not only due to its 
implications for privacy, but due to the particular way in which that data is being utilised to shape 
individual decision-making to serve the interests of commercial Big Data barons.  My central claim is 
that, despite the complexity and sophistication of their underlying algorithmic processes, these 
applications ultimately rely on a deceptively simple design-based mechanism of influence -‘nudge’. By 
configuring and thereby personalising the user’s informational choice context, typically through 
algorithmic analysis of data streams from multiple sources claiming to offer predictive insights 
concerning the habits, preferences and interests of targeted individuals (such as those used by on-line 
consumer product recommendation engines), these nudges channel user choices in directions preferred 
by the choice architect through processes that are subtle, unobtrusive yet extraordinarily powerful. By 
characterizing Big Data analytic techniques as a form of nudge, this provides an analytical lens for 
evaluating their persuasive, manipulative qualities and their legal and political dimensions.  I draw on 
insights from regulatory governance scholarship, behavioural economics, liberal political theory, 
information law scholarship, Science & Technology Studies (STS) and surveillance studies to suggest 
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that, if allowed to continue unchecked, the extensive and accelerating use of commercially driven Big 
Data analytic techniques may seriously erode our capacity for democratic participation and individual 
flourishing. 
 
2. Big Data as a form of design-based regulation 
 
My analysis begins by explaining how Big Data algorithmic techniques seek systematically to influence 
the behaviour of others, drawing on a body of multidisciplinary scholarship concerned with 
interrogating ‘regulatory governance’ regimes and various facets of the regulatory governance process. 
 
2.1 Design-based regulatory techniques 
 
Regulation or regulatory governance is, in essence, a form of systematic control intentionally aimed at 
addressing a collective problem.  As Julia Black puts it, ‘[r]egulation, or regulatory governance, is the 
organised attempt to manage risks or behaviour in order to achieve a publicly stated objective or set of 
objectives’ (Black 2014: 2).1  Many scholars analyse regulation as a cybernetic process involving three 
core components that form the basis of any control system – i.e. ways of gathering information 
(‘information gathering and monitoring’); ways of setting standards, goals or targets (‘standard-
setting’); and ways of changing behaviour to meet the standards or targets (‘behaviour modification’) 
(Hood et al 2001). Within this literature, the techniques employed by regulators to attain their desired 
social outcome are well established as an object of study (Morgan and Yeung 2007).  While legal 
scholars tend to focus on traditional ‘command and control’ techniques in which the law prohibits 
specified conduct, backed by coercive sanctions for violation, cyberlawyers and criminologists have 
explored how ‘design’ (or ‘code’) operates as a regulatory instrument (Lessig 1999; Zittrain 2007; von 
Hirsh et al 2000; Clarke and Newman 2005).    Although design and technology can be employed at the 
information-gathering phase (eg. the use of CCTV cameras to monitor behaviour) and behaviour 
modification phase of the regulatory cycle (eg. car alarms which trigger if unauthorised interference is 
detected), design-based regulation embeds standards into design at the standard-setting stage in order to 
foster social outcomes deemed desirable (such as ignition locking systems which prevent vehicle engines 
from starting unless the occupants’ seatbelts are fastened), thus distinguishing design-based regulation 
from the use of technology to facilitate regulatory purposes more generally (Yeung 2008; Yeung 2016). 
 
2.2 Choice architecture and ‘nudge’ as instruments for influencing behaviour 
 
                                                        
1  This definition amalgamates various refinements to the definition of regulation which Julia Black has 
offered over time: see Black (2001), Black (2008: 139) and Black (2014:2). 
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Since 2008, considerable academic attention has focused on one kind of design-based approach to 
shaping behaviour – nudge - thanks to Thaler and Sunstein, who claim that a nudge is ‘any aspect of 
choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives.’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008:6).  The intellectual 
heritage of Nudge rests in experiments in cognitive psychology which seek to understand human 
decision-making, finding considerable divergence between the rational actor model of decision-making 
assumed in microeconomic analysis and how individuals actually make decisions due to their pervasive 
use of cognitive shortcuts and heuristics (Kahneman and Tversky 1974; 1981).  Critically, much 
individual decision-making occurs subconsciously, passively and unreflectively rather than through 
active, conscious deliberation (Kahneman 2013). Drawing on these findings, Thaler and Sunstein 
highlight how the surrounding decisional choice context can be intentionally designed in ways that 
systematically influence human decision-making in particular directions.  For example, to encourage 
customers to choose healthier food items, they suggest that cafeteria managers place the healthy options 
more prominently– such as placing the fruit in front of the chocolate cake (Thaler and Sunstein 2008: 
1).  Due to the ‘availability’ heuristic and the influence of ‘priming’, customers will systematically tend 
to opt for the more ‘available’ healthier items.   
 
2.3 Big Data analytics as informational choice architecture 
 
To understand how Big Data analytics techniques utilise nudge, we can distinguish two broad 
configurations of Big Data driven digital decision-making analytic processes: 
 
(a) automated decision-making processes: Many common transactions rely upon automated decision-making 
processes, ranging from ticket dispensing machines to highly sophisticated techniques used by some 
financial institutions offering consumer credit, such as pay-day loan company Wonga 
(https://www.wonga.com/loans-online).  Although varying widely in complexity and sophistication, 
not all of which rely on Big Data driven analytics, these decision-processes automatically issue some kind 
of ‘decision’ without any need for human intervention beyond user input of relevant data (or data 
tokens) and thus constitute a form of action-forcing (or coercive) design (Brownsword 2006; Yeung & 
Dixon-Woods 2010); and 
 
(b) digital decision guidance processes: In contrast, digital decision ‘guidance’ processes are designed so that 
it is not the machine, but the targeted individual, who makes the relevant decision.  These technologies 
seek to direct or guide the individual’s decision-making processes in ways identified by the underlying 
software algorithm as ‘optimal’, by offering ‘suggestions’ intended to prompt the user to make decisions 
preferred by the choice architect (Sellinger and Seager 2012).   
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While automated algorithmic decision-making raises serious concerns (eg; Citron 2008; Citron and 
Pasquale 2014; Pasquale 2015), this paper focuses on Big Data driven decision guidance techniques.  
These techniques harness nudges for the purpose of ‘selection optimisation’.  Consider how internet 
search engines operate: in response to a query, Big Data analytic techniques mine millions of webpages 
with lightning speed, algorithmically evaluating their ‘relevance’ and displaying the results in rank 
order.   In the Google search engine, for example, the most prominently displayed sites are ‘paid for’ 
sponsored listings (thus enabling firms to pay for search engine salience), followed by weblinks ranked in 
order of Google’s algorithmically determined relevance. Although theoretically free to review all the 
potentially relevant pages (from the hundreds of thousands ranked), in practice each individual searcher 
is likely to visit only those on the first page or two (Pasquale 2006).   Hence the user’s click through 
behavior is subject to the ‘priming’ effect, brought about by the algorithmic configuration of her 
informational choice architecture seeking to ‘nudge’ her click through behavior in directions favoured 
by the choice architect.  For Google, this entails driving web traffic in directions that promote greater 
use of Google applications (thereby increasing the value of Google’s sponsored advertising space).  
Other algorithmic selection optimization techniques operate in a similar fashion, helping the user 
identify which data items to target from a very large population.  For example, so-called ‘predictive 
policing’ techniques use Big Data analytics to identify the ‘highest risk’ individuals or other targets to 
assist enforcement officials determine their inspection priorities, thereby increasing the efficiency and 
efficacy of their inspection and enforcement processes (eg. Cuckier and Mayer-Schonberger: 186-189).   
 
Although the concept of nudge is simple, Big Data decision-guidance analytics utilize nudge in a highly 
sophisticated manner.  Compare a simple static nudge in the form of the speed hump, and a highly 
sophisticated, dynamic Big-Data driven nudge in the form of Google Maps navigation function.  In 
neither case is the driver compelled to act in the manner identified as optimal by the nudge’s architect.  
Hence a motorist approaching a speed hump willing to endure the discomfort and potential vehicle 
damage that may result from proceeding over the hump at speed need not slow down.   Nor is the 
driver using Google Maps compelled to follow the ‘suggestions’ it offers. But if the driver fails to follow 
a suggested direction, Google Maps simply reconfigures its guidance relative to the vehicle’s new 
location via algorithmic analysis of live data streams that track both the vehicle’s location and traffic 
congestion ‘hot spots’ that are algorithmically predicted to affect how quickly the vehicle will reach its 
desired destination. 
 
While the self-executing quality of many static forms of design-based regulatory instruments obviates 
the need for human intervention, so that the enforcement response is automatically administered once 
the requisite standard has been reached, this makes them a rather blunt form of control (Latour 1994: 
39-40).  Although vehicles should proceed slowly in residential areas to ensure public safety, speed 
humps invariably slow down emergency vehicles responding to call-outs. In contrast, Big Data driven 
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nudges avoid the over and under-inclusiveness of static forms of design-based regulation (Yeung 2008).  
Big Data driven nudges make it possible for automatic enforcement to take place dynamically (Degli-
Esporti 2014), with both the standard and its execution being continuously updated and refined within a 
networked environment that enables real-time data feeds which, crucially, can be used to personalise 
algorithmic outputs (Rieder 2015).  Networked, Big Data driven digital guidance technologies thus 
operate as self-contained cybernetic systems, with the entire tripartite regulatory cycle continuously 
implemented via a recursive feedback loop which allows dynamic adjustment of both the standard 
setting and behaviour modification phases of the regulatory cycle enabling an individual’s choice 
architecture to be continuously reconfigured in real-time in three directions:  
 
a) refinement of the individual’s choice environment in response to changes in the target’s behaviour and 
the broader environment, identified by the algorithm designer as relevant to the target’s decision-
making, based on analysis of the target’s constantly expanding data profile; 
 
b) data feedback to the choice architect, which can itself be collected, stored and repurposed for other 
Big Data applications; and 
 
c) monitoring and refinement of the individual’s choice environment in light of population-wide trends 
identified via population-wide Big Data surveillance and analysis. 
 
Big Data driven nudging is therefore nimble, unobtrusive and highly potent, providing the data subject 
with a highly personalised choice environment - hence I refer to these techniques as ‘hypernudge’. 
Hypernudging relies on highlighting algorithmically determined correlations between data items within 
data sets that would not otherwise be observable through human cognition alone (or even with standard 
computing support (Shaw 2014)) thereby conferring ‘salience’ on the highlighted data patterns, 
operating through the technique of ‘priming’, dynamically configuring the user’s informational choice 
context in ways intentionally designed to influence her decisions. 
 
3. Are Big-data driven ‘hypernudge’ techniques legitimate? 
 
Although hypernudging entails the use of ‘soft’ power, it is extraordinarily strong (i.e. ‘soft’ power 
need not be ‘weak’: Nys 2004).  And, where power lies, there also lies the potential for overreaching, 
exploitation and abuse.  How then, should the legitimacy of hypernudge be assessed, understood 
primarily in terms of conformity with liberal democratic principles and values rooted in respect for 
individual autonomy? Before proceeding, two considerations should be borne in mind.  First, the 
massive power asymmetry between global digital service providers, particularly Google and Facebook, 
and individual service users cannot be ignored (Zuboff 2015) especially given that the scale of corporate 
 7 
economic surveillance via Big Data tracking dwarfs the surveillance conducted by national intelligence 
agencies (Harcourt 2014) particularly as the Internet of Things devices continues to spread its tentacles 
into every area of daily life (Peppett 2014). Secondly, Big Data hypernudging operates on a one-to-many 
basis.  Unlike the speed hump which directly affects only one or two vehicles at any moment in time 
when proceeding over it, a single algorithmic hypernudge initiated by Facebook can directly affect 
millions of users simultaneously.  Hence Facebook’s soft algorithmic power is many orders of magnitude 
greater than those wishing to install speed humps to reduce vehicle speeds and is therefore considerably 
more troubling. 
 
3.1 The Liberal Manipulation Critique of Nudge 
 
Despite enthusiastic embrace by policy-makers in the USA and UK, Thaler & Sunstein’s nudge proposals 
have been extensively criticised.  Leaving aside criticisms of the idea of ‘libertarian paternalism’ which 
Thaler and Sunstein claim provides the philosophical underpinnings of nudge, two lines of critique have 
emerged: those doubting their effectiveness, and those which highlight their covert, manipulative 
quality.  My analysis focuses on the second cluster of criticisms (the ‘liberal manipulation’ critique.)   
 
(a) The illegitimate motive critique (the ‘active’ manipulation critique):  First, several critics 
fear that nudges may be used for illegitimate purposes. Consider the so-called ‘Facebook experiments’ 
undertaken by social media giant Facebook by manipulating nearly 700,000 users’ News Feeds (that is, 
the flow of comments, videos, pictures and web links posted by other people in their social network) to 
test whether exposure to emotions led people to change their own Facebook posting-behaviours through 
a process of ‘emotional contagion’ (Kramer et al 2014) provoking a storm of protest.  Critics called it a 
mass experiment in emotional manipulation, accusing Facebook of violating ethical and legal guidelines 
by failing to notify affected users that they were being manipulated in the experiment (cf Meyer 2015). 
Facebook defended its actions as legitimately attempting ‘to improve our services and to make the 
content people see on Facebook as relevant and engaging as possible’ (Booth 2014).  But five months 
after the experiments became public, Facebook Chief Technology Officer Mike Schroepfer 
acknowledged that it had mishandled the study, announcing that a new internal ‘enhanced review 
process’ for handling internal experiments and research that may later be published would be instituted 
(Luckerson 2014). 
 
(b) The nudge as deception critique (the ‘passive’ manipulation critique): Secondly, even if 
utilised to pursue legitimate purposes, others argue that nudges that deliberately seek to exploit 
cognitive weaknesses to provoke desired behaviours entail a form of deception  (Bovens 2008; Yeung 
2012). The paradigmatic autonomous decision is that of a mentally competent, fully informed 
individual, arrived at through a process of rational self-deliberation, so that the individual’s chosen 
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outcome can be justified and explained by reference to reasons which the agent has identified and 
endorsed (Berlin 1969: 131).  Yet the causal mechanism through which many nudges are intended to 
work deliberately seek to by-pass the individual’s rational decision-making process, exploiting their 
cognitive irrationalities and thus entailing illegitimate manipulation, expressing contempt and disrespect 
for individuals as autonomous, rational beings capable of reasoned-decision making concerning their 
own affairs (Yeung 2012: 137). These concerns resonate with legal critiques which highlight how 
powerful internet intermediaries  (such as Google), act as critical gatekeepers, with Pasquale and Bracha 
observing that search engines filter and rank websites based on criteria that will inevitably be structurally 
biased (designed to satisfy users and maintain a competitive edge over rivals), thus generating 
systematically skewed results aimed at promoting the underlying interests of the gatekeeper, thus 
distorting the capacity of individuals to make informed, meaningful choices and undermining individual 
autonomy (Pasquale & Bracha 2015). 
 
(c) The lack of transparency critique: Pasquale and Bracha’s concerns reflect growing calls for 
institutional mechanisms that can effectively secure ‘algorithmic accountability,’ given that sophisticated 
algorithms are increasingly utilised to render decisions, or intentionally to influence the decisions of 
others, yet operate as ‘black boxes’, tightly shielded from external scrutiny despite their immense 
influence over flows of information and power (Diakopoloulos 2013; Pasquale 2015; Rauhofer 2015).   
Critics of nudge also highlight their lack of transparency, drawing analogies with subliminal advertising 
which are widely regarded as unethical and illegitimate (cf Thaler and Sunstein 244). Although 
traditional nudge techniques vary in their level of transparency (Bovens 2008) the critical mechanisms of 
influence utilized by hypernudging are embedded into the design of complex, machine-learning 
algorithms, which are highly opaque (and typically protected by trade secrets: Rauhofer 2015; Pasquale 
2006), thus exacerbating concerns of abuse.   
 
3.2 Can these concerns be overcome via notice and consent? 
 
Can these objections to the opacity and manipulative quality of hypernudging be overcome, either 
through individual consent to their use or because substantive considerations are sufficiently weighty to 
override them?2 I will focus on the first of these possibilities, employing a rights-based approach viewed 
through the lens of liberal political theory (Raz 1986; Dworkin 1977) before interrogating this approach 
by drawing on insights from STS and surveillance studies.  The right most clearly implicated by Big Data 
driven hypernudging is the right to informational privacy, given the continuous monitoring of 
                                                        
2  In relation to big data surveillance techniques by government intelligence agencies, considerable 
discussion has focused on the extent to which interests of public and national security overrides fundamental rights, 
such as rights to liberty and privacy: in the USA, see for example The President’s Review Group on Intelligence 
and Communications Technologies (2013). 
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individuals and the collection and algorithmic processing of personal digital data which hypernudging 
entails.  Legal critiques of Big Data processing techniques (and their antecedents) have therefore largely 
centred on whether the systematic collection, storage, processing and re-purposing of personal digital 
data collected via the internet has been authorised by affected individuals thereby waiving their right to 
informational privacy. 
 
Contemporary data protection laws rest on what Daniel Solove calls a model of ‘privacy self-
management’ in which the law provides individuals with a set of rights aimed at enabling them to 
exercise control over the use of their personal data, with individuals deciding for themselves how to 
weigh the costs and benefits of personal data sharing, storage and processing (Solove 2013).  This 
approach ultimately rests on the paradigm of ‘notice and consent’, which contemporary data protection 
scholars have strenuously criticised. Critics argue that individuals are highly unlikely to give meaningful, 
voluntary consent to the data sharing and processing activities entailed by Big Data analytic techniques, 
highlighting insuperable challenges faced by individuals navigating a rapidly evolving technological 
landscape in which they are invited to share their personal data in return for access to digital services 
(Acquisti et al 2015).  First, there is overwhelming evidence that most people neither read nor 
understand on-line privacy policies which users must ‘accept’ before accessing digital services, with one 
oft-cited study estimating that if an individual actually read them, this would consume 244 hours per 
year (McDonald and Cranor 2008).  Various studies, including those of Lorrie Crannor, have sought to 
devise creative, practical solutions that will enable on-line mechanisms to provide helpful and 
informative notice to networked users, yet all have been found inadequate: either because they were not 
widely used, easily circumvented or misunderstood (Crannor et al 2014-2015).   Secondly, people 
struggle to make informed decisions about their informational privacy due to problems of bounded 
rationality and problems of aggregation: struggling to manage their privacy relations with the hundreds 
of digital service providers that they interact with on-line (Solove 2013: 1890) and finding it difficult, if 
not impossible, adequately to assess the risk of harm in a series of isolated transactions given that many 
privacy harms are cumulative in nature (Solove 2013: 1891).  Thirdly, individuals’ privacy preferences 
are highly malleable and context-dependent.  An impressive array of empirical privacy studies 
demonstrate that people experience considerable uncertainty about the importance of privacy owing to 
difficulties in ascertaining the potential consequences of privacy behaviour, often exacerbated by the 
intangible nature of many privacy harms (eg how harmful is it if a stranger becomes aware of one’s life 
history?) and given that privacy is rarely an unalloyed good but typically involves trade offs (Acquisti et 
al 2015).  Empirical studies demonstrate that individuals’ privacy behaviours are easily influenced 
through environmental cues, such as defaults, and the design of web environments owing to pervasive 
reliance on heuristics and social norms.  Because people are often ‘at sea’ when it comes to the 
consequences of their feelings about privacy, they typically cast around for cues in their environment to 
guide their behavior, including the behaviour of others and their past experiences, so that one’s privacy 
 10 
preferences are highly context dependent rather than stable and generalizable to a wide range of settings 
(Acquisti et al 2015). According to Acquisti and his colleagues, this extensive uncertainty and context 
dependence implies that people cannot be counted on to navigate the complex trade-offs involving 
privacy in a self-interested fashion  (Acquisti et al 2015).  Thus many information law scholars seriously 
doubt that individual acceptance of the ‘terms and conditions’ offered by digital service providers 
(including Google, Facebook, Twitter and Amazon), typically indicated by clicking on a web page link, 
constitutes meaningful waiver of one’s underlying rights to informational privacy  (Solove 2013: 1880-
1903) which even the industry itself acknowledges is a serious problem3.    
 
The adequacy of a privacy self-management model is further undermined in the Big Data environment.4  
First, the ‘transparency paradox’, identified by Helen Nissenbaum, emphasizes that in the complex and 
highly dynamic information network ecology that now characterises the internet, individuals must be 
informed about the types of information being collected, with whom it is shared, and for what purpose, 
in order to give meaningful consent.  But providing the level of detail needed to enable users to provide 
genuinely informed consent would overwhelm even savvy users because the practices themselves are 
volatile and indeterminate, as new providers, parties and practices emerge, all constantly augmenting 
existing data flows (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014: 59).  Yet to avoid information overload, reliance on 
simplified, plain language notices is also inadequate, failing to provide sufficiently detailed information 
to enable people make informed decisions (Nissenbaum 2011).  Secondly, the right to informational 
privacy includes the ‘purpose specification principle,’ requiring data collectors to state clearly the 
explicit purpose of collecting and processing that data at the time of collection.5  Yet, as Ryan Harkins, 
Microsoft’s privacy lawyer observes, this principle is largely antiethical to the concept of Big Data, 
                                                        
 
3  To quote Microsoft’s privacy lawyer, Ryan Harkins, ‘the informed consent edifice is cracking, because it 
places much of the burden on individuals who are expected to read privacy notices’ … ‘while the notice and 
consent edifice may have been cracking before, I think it’s fair to say that big data threatens to obliterate it 
altogether because big data will mean that there will be even more data collected.  It’ll be overwhelming and it 
will make it extremely hard for individuals to provide effective consent or make informed decisions about all of the 
data that’s being collected about them and about all of the prospective uses of the data….and this challenge will be 
compounded by the rise of the internet of things’ per Harkins cited in Crannor et al 2014-15: 795-786. 
 
4  In the USA and Canada, this right is protected primarily through the Fair Information Principles through 
specific legislation in particular contexts while in the EU, it is primarily protected via the EU Data Protection 
Directive and the ECHR Article 8 right to privacy.  
 
5  In the EU Data Protection Directive, this is expressed in Art 6(1)(b) which provides that ‘Member States 
shall provide that personal data must be… (b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical or 
scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate 
safeguards’ (EU Directive 95/46/EC).  The OECD Fair Information Practice Principles includes the ‘Purpose 
Specification Principle’, which provides that ‘[t]he purposes for which personal data are collected should be 
specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those 
purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of 
change of purpose.’ (http://oecdprivacy.org/) 
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which is all about collecting more and more data in the hope that you might subsequently be able to use 
it in unexpected ways (Crannor et al 2014-15).  The public furore surrounding the Facebook 
experiments is instructive.  Although Facebook claimed that all 700,000 individuals who were subjected 
to the experiment had provided informed consent by accepting Facebook’s terms of service, critics 
claim that this fell well short of the ‘informed consent’ that underpins universally accepted ethical 
principles governing research on human subjects exemplified in the Helsinki Declaration (World 
Medical Association 2013). The affected Facebook users could not reasonably have expected that they 
would be subjected to systematic emotional experimentation when they accepted Facebook’s terms and 
service, but nor is Facebook likely to have contemplated that possibility either, so it could not have 
specified this proposed purpose in its terms and conditions at that time (although Facebook could have 
notified affected users of its intention prior to conducting the experiment and offered them an 
opportunity to opt out).    
 
Thirdly, the primary business model through which Big Data is being monetized preys directly upon the 
susceptibility of individuals’ privacy behaviour to subconscious external influence, particularly the 
powerful heuristics associated with ostensibly ‘free’ services.  The predominant business model for 
contemporary digital services is one of ‘barter’, with users agreeing to disclose their personal data to 
firms in return for services (Van Dijck 2014: 2000) under a ‘free’ rather than ‘fee’ for services revenue 
model, thereby eliminating an important barrier to adoption faced by firms seeking to attract new 
customers with initially high uncertainty about their valuation of the service offered (Lambrecht 2013).  
Yet, as behavioural economist Dan Ariely demonstrates, ‘the power of free can get us to make many 
foolish decisions’ (Ariely 2009). Accordingly, in a Big Data environment, existing notice and consent 
model cannot be relied upon to protect the right to informational privacy, given that individuals are 
typically asked to consent to the processing of their personal data at some future time, for purposes they 
could not reasonably have contemplated. 
 
3.3 Authorising Deception? 
 
Although digital privacy policies are often drafted in breathtakingly broad, open-ended terms that could 
be literally interpreted to include Big Data driven hypernudging techniques, these policies are 
inadequate to authorize their deceptive qualities.  Deception is a prima facie moral wrong because it 
violates the autonomy of the person deceived, involving the control of another without that person’s 
consent (Wendler 1996: 91).  Thus in addition to the right to informational privacy, on-line digital 
users have a separate and distinct right not to be deceived, rooted in a moral agent’s basic right to be 
treated with dignity and respect.  Thus, even assuming that routine acceptance of on-line privacy notices 
constitutes valid consent by a user to the sharing and processing of her personal data on-line, this 
consent does not thereby constitute a concomitant waiver of her right to not to be deceived.  For this, 
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specific consent to the use of techniques of deception is needed.   Consider, for example, a cafeteria 
manager who, wishing to encourage healthier food choices, places the following sign at the cafeteria 
entrance: 
 
Many patrons want to eat healthy food but often have difficulty choosing the healthier items when selecting 
from the food on display.  In order to assist then, we have arranged the food items on display with the 
healthier items displayed more prominently, making it more likely that customers will choose those items. 
 
Although such a notice may overcome the manipulative, opaque qualities of the nudge in question 
(particularly if customers may leave the cafeteria and dine elsewhere), it is likely to distort the 
effectiveness of the nudge in eliciting the desired behavioural response.  As Bovens puts it, the 
psychological mechanisms that are exploited by nudge techniques ‘work best in the dark’ (Bovens 2008: 
3).   
 
It is also doubtful whether disclosure by digital service providers that they are withholding material 
information is sufficient to overcome these objections, particularly if fundamental rights are implicated.  
Consider the practice of ‘digital gerrymandering,’ a term coined by leading American cyberscholar 
Jonthan Zittrain following the Facebook experiments to describe how easily social media platforms 
could utilize Big Data analytics actively to manipulate the voting behavior of individuals during an 
election campaign. For Zittrain, digital gerrymandering ‘clearly seem wrong,’ yet he struggles to 
articulate the nature of the wrong, suggesting it might constitute an ‘abuse of a powerful platform’ 
(Zittrain 2014).  Might such a practice be acceptable if Facebook’s terms and conditions included the 
following? 
 
The content of your news feeds is determined by an algorithm that has been constructed in ways 
intended to foster Facebook’s success as a commercial enterprise.   
 
This notice seems inadequate to authorize digital gerrymandering, because it fails to provide users with 
sufficient notice of the deceptive nature of the technique involved.  Consider then the following more 
detailed statement: 
 
The content of your newsfeeds is determined by an algorithm that has been constructed in ways intended 
to encourage you to favour the views of political candidates favoured by Facebook.  
 
By notifying users that relevant information of a certain kind will be omitted from their news feeds, 
users who are unhappy with this policy can stop using the service, while those who are content to 
proceed might be regarded as providing ‘second order consent’, thereby waiving their right not to be 
deceived (Wedler 1996) and their underlying democratic and constitutional rights to freedom of 
information and political participation. But second order consent processes would not overcome the 
objection that in practice, people do not read digital privacy notices, let alone properly comprehend 
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their consequences.  Furthermore, as Zuboff observes, the tools Google offers ‘respond to the needs of 
beleaguered second modernity individuals – like the apple in the garden – once tasted, they are 
impossible to live without’ (Zuboff 2015: 83).   
 
Digital gerrymandering is an extreme example, but it nevertheless highlights how Big Data 
hypernudging techniques could be employed in ways that undermine individual autonomy and the 
quality of democratic participation.  But what of techniques that are not so obviously deceptive nor 
directly implicate democratic participation – the kinds of practices that might be regarded as more akin 
to conventionally accepted marketing techniques used by firms to peddle their wares? What of the 
algorithmic design of Facebook functions aimed at keeping users logged in to Facebook, since the longer 
they linger, the more advertising they exposed to, thereby enhancing the commercial value of Facebook? 
As Bernard Rieder argues, Big Data driven algorithmic models are being used by institutions as a form of 
‘accounting realism’ to ‘sniff out patterns or differentiations in data and, by optimising for a target 
variable, transform them into (economic) opportunity’ in pursuit of self-serving purposes (Rieder 
2015).  Yet liberal political theory has little to say about such techniques – if their use is adequately 
disclosed and duly consented to, there is nothing further of concern: individual autonomy is respected, 
while the market mechanism fosters innovation in the digital services industry.  
 
4.  Post-liberal Critiques: Selective Insights from STS and Surveillance Studies 
 
The inability of the liberal political tradition to grasp how commercial applications of Big Data driven 
hypernudging implicate deeper societal, democratic and ethical concerns is ultimately traceable to its 
understanding of the self and the self-society relation.  As Julie Cohen observes, within the liberal 
tradition, the ‘self’ as legal subject, has three principal attributes:  (1) the self is a definitionally 
autonomous being possessed of liberty rights that are presumed capable of exercise regardless of 
context; (2) the legal subject possesses the capacity for rational deliberation and this capacity too is 
detached from contexts, situated within the tradition of Enlightenment rationalism in which the 
existence of universal truths amenable to rational discourse and analysis is presumed; and (3) the 
selfhood that the legal subject possesses is transcendent and immaterial - it is distinct from the body in 
which the legal subject resides (Cohen 2012). This, she argues, results is an emphasis on individual 
consent and a conception of privacy harm that is both economic and individualized so that the ‘distress’ 
associated with interference attracts little monetary compensation (Cohen 2012; Rauhofer 2015). 
Cohen laments US law’s response to concerns about the genuineness of consent in networked 
environments by seeking to correct information asymmetries faced by the liberal consumer when 
consenting to data collection for profiling purposes (Cohen 2015). For Cohen, by looking to economics 
rather than sociology, which is more congenial to law’s conventional grounding in philosophical 
commitments associated with liberal political theory (rather than political theory more generally), and 
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to analytic philosophy rather than the sociology of knowledge, the centrality of consent in the liberal 
paradigm is reinforced, conveying the impression that there is nothing more at stake individually or 
collectively (Cohen 2015).  
 
The liberal account’s emphasis on consent flows naturally from the special significance of individual 
choice.  My self-regarding choices are imbued with moral and political significance simply because they 
are mine, and it is presumed in liberal societies that they are worthy of respect, however foolish or 
unwise, for that reason alone.  The core liberal idea of personality articulated in terms of personal 
autonomy demands that individuals be allowed to choose and pursue their different plans or paths of life 
for themselves without interference from others (Kleinig 1985).  But what, exactly, constitutes an 
‘interference’ with an agent’s choice (Yeung 2016)?  While coercive choice architectures (evident in the 
design of prisons, for example, or the gunman who offers his victim ‘your money or your life?’) clearly 
constitute interferences, what of the rearrangement of the informational choice architecture intended to 
nudge the agent’s choices in particular directions?  Choices cannot be made abstracted from their 
context: they are always made from a limited choice set or options and, so long as we interact others, 
the actions of others will affect the range of options open to us at any time (Wertheimer 1987).  Yet 
from the liberal viewpoint, except in relation to pervasive choices (Raz 1986) one cannot object simply 
on the basis that the actions of another have reduced the scope of one’s choices.  As White reminds us, 
when I take the last seat at the bar, you have to stand or go find somewhere else to drink and, from the 
liberal perspective, there is nothing problematic about this (White 2010).   
 
But conventional liberal accounts of individual autonomy are criticised by those who highlight their 
problematic divergence from aspects of identity through which most of us define ourselves6.  These 
critics point out that we are deeply enmeshed in identity-constituting relations, cultural and other 
connections, and that we have little or no choice over some aspects of the self (such as our embodiment) 
and which conventional liberal accounts fail to take seriously (Christman 2009).  One strand of STS 
scholarship can be understood as taking these critiques even further, rejecting conventional liberal 
conceptions of the autonomous self by emphasizing the nature of human self-hood as both embodied and 
subjectively experienced (Kleinmann and Moore 2014) and thus offer a more realistic account of the 
actual, embodied experience of individuals and human decision-making.  Rather than decontextualize 
and abstract the self from her environment, these inquiries focus on how individual self-understanding 
and self-development are pervasively shaped by the surrounding environment, including technological 
artefacts.   Networked information communications technologies, like other artefacts, shape and 
mediate our relationship with the world around us and, over time, we come to perceive the world 
                                                        
6  The concept of ‘relational autonomy’ offers a potentially fruitful approach: see Nedeksky 1990; 
Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000).  I am indebted to Barbara Prainsack for drawing my attention to this literature. 
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through the lenses that our artefacts create (Verbeek 2006).  As a result, networked information 
technologies directly configure citizens themselves, actively shaping the relationship between humans 
and their world, and the way in which they perceive and understand themselves (Cohen 2012).   
 
So understood, Big Data hypernudging constitutes a ‘soft’ a mechanism of surveillant control.  But, 
unlike the disciplinary control emphasised by Foucault and epitomised by Bentham’s Panopticon (Lyon 
2014: 6), Big Data’s algorithmic control operates in a more subtle yet ‘seductive’ manner (Boyne 2000) 
via continuous feedback loops based on an on-line user’s interactions, configuring individuals on-line by 
‘tailoring their conditions of possibility’ (Cheney-Lippold 2011:169). The resulting form of control is 
both more potent and powerful than the kind of disciplinary control typically associated with pre-digital 
forms of surveillance which rely upon the coercive experience of living with the uncertainty of being 
seen (Lyon 2007: 59).  Yet this process is essential to an emerging form of information capitalism which 
Shoshana Zuboff dubs ‘surveillance capitalism’, dominated by powerful transnational corporations 
(‘surveillance capitalists’) (Zuboff 2015). Unlike industrial capitalism, in which power was identified 
with the ownership of the means of production and which prevailed from the early to late twentieth 
century, the surveillance capitalism emerging at the dawn of the 21st century produces a new form of 
power, constituting a new kind of invisible hand in which power is now identified with ownership of the 
means of behavioural modification (Zuboff 2015: 82). It rests on a default business model that depends 
upon ‘eyeballs’ rather than revenue as a predictor of remunerative surveillance assets (Zuboff 2015: 81).  
 
While Zuboff regards Google’s products and practices as the leading exemplar of surveillance capitalism 
at work, Facebook’s News Feed algorithm vivid illustrates the role of algorithms in this emerging ‘logic 
of accumulation’(Zuboff 2015).  Victor Luckerson has recently described how News Feed’s 
controversial emergence in 2006 has evolved into ‘the most valuable billboard on Earth’, tracing its 
evolution from a fairly crude algorithm based on essentially arbitrary judgments by software engineers 
assigning point scores to different features of Facebook posts to determine their ranking, into a complex 
machine learning system that provides a much more individualized user experience, in which the 
algorithm adapts to users’ behavior – for example, people who click on more photos see more pictures, 
and those who don’t see fewer (Luckerson 2015). Because the average Facebook user has access to about 
1500 posts per day but only looks at 300, most see only a sliver of the potential posts in their network 
each day: hence algorithmic ranking critically determines how these posts are filtered and highlighted in 
users’ News Feed (Luckerson 2015).  Facebook therefore invests substantially in developing its News 
Feed algorithm, claiming to use thousands of factors to determine what shows up in any individual’s 
news feed, and typically making two to three changes to the algorithm weekly.    This is Zuboff’s 
surveillance capitalism in operation, undertaken by Facebook for purposes that are portrayed as offering 
customers a highly personalised, ‘meaningful’ informational environment that is dynamically and 
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efficiently updated in ways ultimately designed to foster and entrench Facebook as the leading global 
provider of social networking services, thus securing and expanding its revenue base. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have demonstrated how Big Data driven decision guidance techniques can be understood as a design-
based instrument of control, operating as a potent form of ‘nudge’. The algorithmic analysis of data 
patterns dynamically configure the targeted individual’s choice environment in highly personalised ways, 
affecting individual users’ behavior and perceptions by subtly molding the networked user’s 
understanding of the surrounding world.  Their distinctly manipulative, if not straightforwardly 
deceptive, qualities arise from deliberately exploiting systematic cognitive weaknesses which pervade 
human decision-making to channel behaviour in directions preferred by the choice architect.   Yet for 
liberals, except in clear cases of deception, and provided that the targeted individual consents to the 
deliberate configuration of her informational choice environment, having been duly notified of the 
choice architect’s purpose, there is nothing especially troubling about them (Ford 2000). It is this largely 
liberal perspective that informs the work of many privacy law scholars, who highlight the inadequacy of 
notice and consent procedures in digital, networked environments, emphasising the systematic failure of 
users to either read or properly understand the significance of digital privacy policies so that the action 
of clicking on a website to indicate user acceptance typically falls well short of the informed consent 
required to authorise interfere with fundamental rights.  
 
Yet the liberal focus on notice and consent fails grapple with the particular way in which Big Data 
algorithmic techniques exert behavioural influence through the hyperpersonalisation of individuals’ 
informational choice environments.  Optimists, such as Eric Goldman, argue that the algorithmic 
manipulation of general search engine results need not concern us because the efficient functioning of 
markets will ensure that alternative search engines will emerge to provide algorithmic evaluations that 
better meet individual needs (Goldman 2006).  But this fails to recognise that the selective omission of 
relevant information can be deceptive, yet is virtually impossible for affected users to detect.  
Moreover, such naïve faith in the market as a vehicle for securing algorithmic accountability seems 
completely misplaced given the opacity of the underlying algorithms and the lack of awareness or 
understanding by many digital service users of their significance and operation (Karahalios 2014) and the 
dominance of a handful of extraordinarily powerful transnational companies in a global networked 
market for digital services.  
 
Big Data digital guidance technologies are proving difficult for individuals to resist, operating through 
subtle persuasion rather than blunt coercion (Ford 2000).  Supported by the prevailing neoliberal 
ideology that has fuelled the rapid growth of the Big Data industry, these applications ‘beckon with 
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seductive allure’ (Cohen 2012) offering myriad modern conveniences that offer bespoke, highly 
personalised services that are algorithmically designed to respond rapidly, dynamically and as 
unobtrusively and seamlessly as possible.  By willingly and actively allowing ourselves to be 
continuously, pervasively and increasingly subjected to Big Data hypernudging strategies, our 
relationship with the emerging commercial Big Data Barons takes the form of what Natasha Dow Schull 
refers to as ‘asymmetric collusion’. Dow Schull’s observations refer to the relationship between 
gambling addicts and the US gambling industry, in which the latter maximises its returns by successfully 
harnessing the power of algorithmic analytics to adapt the design of both casino layouts and the gambling 
machines which they house, in order to ‘give players what they want’(Dow Schull 2012).  The 
relationship between commercial Big Data-driven service providers and individual is similarly 
structured: through our increasing willingness to submit ourselves to continuous algorithmic 
surveillance in return for the highly tailored convenience and efficiency which their selection 
optimisation tools appear to offer, we also engage in a process of asymmetric collusion that threatens 
ultimately to impoverish us.   Like so many addictions, our short term cravings are likely to be 
detrimental to our long term well-being.  By allowing ourselves to be surveilled and subtly regulated on 
a continuous, highly granular and pervasive basis, we may be slowly but surely eroding our capacity for 
authentic processes of self-creation and development (Cohen 2012).  While lawyers might be tempted 
to dismiss these concerns on the basis that ‘we have given our informed consent’, evidenced by our 
willingness to incorporate these services into our daily lives, this consent is arguably is more akin to that 
of the compulsive gambling addict (Dow Schull 2012) than that the liberal ideal of the autonomous self.  
The neoliberal self is primarily a consumer of digital services, rather than a politically active citizen 
engaged in processes of public deliberation that characterise the deliberative democratic ideal (Gutman 
and Thompson 1996).  As Zuboff chillingly observes, Google’s tools are not the objects of value 
exchange, but ‘hooks’ that ‘lure users into extractive operations that turn ordinary life into the daily 
renewal of a 21st century Faustian pact’ (Zuboff 2015: 83-84).  Yet, she points out that, unlike former 
industrial capitalists, who were dependent upon institutionalised reciprocity between employee and 
consumer populations in the form of durable employment systems, steady wage increases and affordable 
access to goods and services for more consumers, surveillance capitalists are structurally independent 
from their populations, thus allowing them and their practices to escape democratic scrutiny (Zuboff 2-
15: 80). 
 
To take seriously the implications of the Big Data revolution that we are currently embarking upon, we 
must lift our eyes beyond the familiar liberal fixation with notice and consent (Brownsword 2004).  
Before succumbing to the allures of the convenience and efficiency that Big Data claims to offer, we 
must be attentive to its regulatory power, operating as a particularly potent, pervasive yet ‘soft’ form of 
control, modulating our informational environment according to logics that are ultimately outside our 
control and which erode our capacity for democratic self government (Cohen 2012).   As we 
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increasingly retreat into our own algorithmically determined ‘filter bubbles’ (Pariser 2012) our 
exposure to shared, diverse and unexpected experiences that are essential to sustain our capacity for 
individual flourishing and democratic engagement is correspondingly diminished.  If we are to avoid 
narrow and commercially filtered, algorithmically determined lives, we must establish more effective, 
practically enforceable constraints to tame the excesses of Big Data driven hypernudging which will 
secure meaningful accountability over the algorithms that exert ever more influence on our lives, in 
ways that allow genuine democratic participation and input into the design of the networked digital 
technologies which we increasingly find so irresistible. 
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